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Executive Summary 
 
There has been considerable attention given in recent months to the shortfalls faced by state and 
local pension funds. Using the current methodology of assessing pension obligations, the shortfalls 
sum to nearly $1 trillion. Some analysts have argued that by using what they consider to be a more 
accurate methodology, the shortfalls could be more than three times this size. Based on these 
projections, many political figures have argued the need to drastically reduce the generosity of public 
sector pensions, and possibly to default on pension obligations already incurred. 
 
This paper shows: 
 
• Most of the pension shortfall using the current methodology is attributable to the plunge in 
the stock market in the years 2007-2009. If pension funds had earned returns just equal to 
the interest rate on 30-year Treasury bonds in the three years since 2007, their assets would 
be more than $850 billion greater than they are today. This is by far the major cause of 
pension funding shortfalls. While there are certainly cases of pensions that had been under-
funded even before the market plunge, prior years of under-funding is not the main reason 
that pensions face difficulties now. Another $80 billion of the shortfall is the result of the 
fact that states have cutback their contributions as a result of the downturn. 
 
• The argument that pension funds should only assume a risk-free rate of return in assessing 
pension fund adequacy ignores the distinction between governmental units, which need be 
little concerned over the timing of market fluctuations, and individual investors, who must 
be very sensitive to market timing. 
 
This argument also fails to recognize the fact that over a long period, future stock returns are 
inversely related to current price-to-earnings (PE) ratios. If the current PE ratio is relatively 
low, as is now the case, then the assumption that the market will provide below average 
returns implies a further decline in the PE ratio, given the generally accepted growth 
projections for the economy. As a practical matter, the stock market has provided an average 
real return of more than 8 percent for 30-year periods when the PE ratio at the start was 
under 15 to 1. 
 
It is worth noting that if pension funds stop investing in equities, as some have advocated, 
this would imply higher taxes and/or lower benefits for public employees. It would also 
mean that other investors could expect to see higher future returns on their stock holdings.  
 
• The size of the projected state and local government shortfalls measured as a share of future 
gross state products appear manageable. The total shortfall for the pension funds is less than 
0.2 percent of projected gross state product over the next 30 years for most states. Even in 
the cases of the states with the largest shortfalls, the gap is less than 0.5 percent of projected 
state product.  
 
It is also worth noting that some of this shortfall has likely already disappeared as a result of 
the recent rise in the stock market. If this rise is not subsequently reversed, then a substantial 
portion of the funding shortfall has already been eliminated. 
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In sum, most states face pension shortfalls that are manageable, especially if the stock market does 
not face another sudden reversal. The major reason that shortfalls exist at all was the downturn in 
the stock market following the collapse of the housing bubble, not inadequate contributions to 
pension funds. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In recent months, there has been a considerable effort by many political actors to promote fears 
over the size of public pension shortfalls. While many, if not most, public pensions do face 
shortfalls, much of the discussion has been misleading about both the origins of the shortfall and its 
severity. This paper tries to put these issues in a clearer perspective. The first part examines the 
origins of the shortfall by noting the extent to which pensions have lost value due to the recent 
economic crisis. The second section discusses the appropriate rate of return to assume on pension 
fund assets. The third section puts projected pension fund shortfalls in perspective by projecting 
their size relative to future state income. This is followed by a brief conclusion. 
 
 
The Impact of the Economic Crisis on Pension Fund 
Assets   
 
It is important to recognize that the main contributor to the current funding problem facing public 
pension funds was the collapse of the housing bubble and the subsequent downturn in the economy 
and the stock market. The plunge in the stock market led to a sharp decline in the value of pension 
fund assets. Figure 1 below projects pension fund assets if pensions had continued to earn on 
average a 4.5 percent nominal rate of return in the period since the end of 2007. Under this 
assumption, state and local pension fund assets would have been $857 billion higher at the end of 
the third quarter of 2010. 
 
The economic fallout from the collapse of the housing bubble has also led to budget shortfalls in 
state and local governments across the country. One result of these shortfalls is that governments 
reduced payments in pension funds. In the period since the beginning of the recession, annual 
payments into state and local pension funds have averaged $6.9 billion less than withdrawals. By 
contrast, in the three years prior to the downturn, payments averaged $18.4 billion more than 
withdrawals.1 If state and local governments had continued to contribute to their pensions at the 
same rate as they had in the prior three years, then the total assets of these funds would be $77 
billion higher than was reported at the end of the third quarter of 2010. Adding this to the $857 
billion figure above results in an additional $934 billion in pension funds, a figure far higher than 
most estimates of the size of state and local government shortfalls. 
                                                 
1 The data for these calculations are taken from the Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds, Table F.119, Line 3.  
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FIGURE 1 
Change in Public Pension Assets Since the Recession 
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While state and local government pensions should be funded at levels that allow them to weather 
the impact of cyclical downturns, it is important to recognize that the current downturn is by far the 
longest and deepest of the post-war period. The managers of these funds obviously failed to 
recognize the housing bubble and the dangers it posed to the economy, but this was true of the vast 
majority of economic and business analysts at the time. Certainly state and local pension funds were 
not well served by the professional managers who advised them. It might be reasonable to ask why 
financial experts, who were often highly compensated for their services, failed to see such an 
obvious threat to the economy and the stock market as the collapse of a housing bubble.2 However, 
this is an issue of the failings of the financial industry, not the failings of state and local 
governments, except insofar as they exercised poor judgment in buying the industry’s services. 
 
It is also worth noting that at the end of 2007 – the start of the recession – the stock market was not 
hugely out of line with its long-term trends. It had already fallen 5.4 percent from its value at the end 
of the third quarter and it was down by more than 10 percent from the peaks hit at the end of the 
first quarter of 2000, seven and a half years earlier. The price-to-earnings (PE) ratio for the market as 
a whole was 14.5 – roughly even with its long-term average.3 In short, it might have been reasonable 
to expect some market turbulence at the end of 2007, given the impending collapse of the housing 
bubble, but market valuations were no longer at the extraordinary levels of the stock bubble years. 
                                                 
2 It was easy to recognize the housing bubble and the potential dangers it posed to the economy and the stock market 
(see Baker, 2002 and Baker, 2007).  
3 These calculations are taken from the Federal Reserve Board’s Flow of Funds, Table L.213, Line 19. The price-to-
earnings ratio uses after tax corporate earnings based on all corporate profits, including foreign earnings  (Table 1.7.5, 
Line 17), minus taxes (Table 1.14, Line 12).   
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Projecting Future Pension Returns 
 
There has been a recent effort to argue that public pension funds should assume only the risk-free 
Treasury bond rate of return (Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2009). The nature of the argument is that a 
state or local government is no better situated to deal with risk than an individual investor.  
 
Such an argument is problematic for obvious reasons. An individual investor (or family) is unlikely 
to have diverse sources of income that can sustain him/her through difficult periods. A serious 
illness or prolonged period of unemployment is likely to cause the loss of most of an individual 
investors’ income. If the market is down at a point when a sharp loss of income necessitates relying 
on savings, then an individual investor will suffer considerably as a result of taking on risk. 
 
By contrast, it is difficult to envision plausible events that could lead state and local governments to 
experience comparable declines in income. Even the sharp downturn in revenue that followed in the 
wake of the collapse of the housing bubble led to declines in government revenue of less than 10 
percent even in the most hard hit states.  
 
Individual investors must also be concerned about market fluctuations since they only retire once. 
Much of the savings of individual investors are focused on retirement. If the market is depressed at 
the point where they choose to or are forced to retire, then they could have a substantially lower 
income over the rest of their lifetimes than if they managed to retire when the market was on an 
upswing. However, state and local governments don’t generally invest with an endpoint in mind. In 
principle, state and local governments will exist into perpetuity, so a period in which the market is 
depressed need not be of great consequence. 
 
Nonetheless, it is important that returns assumed by pension funds reflect the actual expected value 
for money invested in the stock market. This will depend in turn on the current price-to-earnings 
ratios in the stock market. 
 
Pension fund assumptions on stock returns were certainly not consistent with plausible assumptions 
on the growth of corporate profits and share prices during the 90s stock bubble. Many pension 
funds assumed that stocks would provide their historic rate of return even when PEs were in the 
high 20s or even 30s. For stocks to provide their historic rates of return at such high PEs, it would 
be necessary for PEs to rise even higher, hitting levels of well over 100 to 1 before the middle of the 
century (see Baker 1997; Diamond, 2000; Baker, Krugman, DeLong, 2005; and Weller and Baker, 
2005). 
 
The correct long-term assumption on stock returns must be derived from dividend yields and the 
projected growth rate of corporate profits. This is a simple exercise. The current PE is 
approximately 13.1.4 In the first three quarters of 2010, firms paid out $728.4 billion in dividends, 
roughly 61.0 percent of the after-tax corporate profits.5 This is very close to the average share of 
                                                 
4 This is based on the $15.7 trillion market value of domestic corporations at the end of the 3rd quarter of 2010 (Flow 
of Funds Table, L.213, Line 23) divided by corporate profits minus taxes for the first three quarters $1,194.2 billion  
(NIPA Table 1.12 line 42 minus line 44).   
5 Net stock purchases should be added to dividend payments since share buybacks are effectively an alternative way for 
firms to transfer earnings to their shareholders. In 2010, net share purchases were -$7.6 billion (Flow of Funds, Table 
F.4, Line 12).  
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corporate profits paid out as dividends over the last two decades, which means that 2010 was not 
atypical. This implies a dividend yield of 4.0 percent.  
 
Corporate profit growth tracks GDP growth reasonably well over the long-term. This means that 
the projected returns would simply be the sum of the dividend yield, plus net share buybacks, and 
the average growth rate of GDP over the period in question. This is shown for the next 30 years in 
Table 1 below. The first column shows the projected capitalization of the U.S. market assuming that 
stock prices rise on average in step with corporate profits (i.e. the PE ratio remains constant) and 
that corporate profits increase at the same rate as the economy. The second column shows the 
annual dividend yields plus share buybacks, under the assumption that after-tax profits rise in step 
with GDP growth and the share of profits paid back to shareholders remains fixed. The third 
column shows the total return on stocks. This is the sum of the dividend and the capital gain. Over 
the period from 2011 to 2041, the average capital gain is projected to be 4.4 percent based on the 
Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) projection for the nominal growth rate in the economy. This 
gives an average nominal return of 8.4 percent from stock holdings. 
 
The fourth column projects the nominal return for the pension portfolio as a whole. The 
calculations assume that two-thirds of pension assets are held in equities or assets that might be 
expected to give a comparable return, such as hedge funds. It assumes that the other third is 
invested in long-term Treasury bonds (National Association of State Pension Fund Administrators 
2010, Figure J). It projects an average interest rate of 5.0 percent for 30-year Treasury bonds 
(roughly a half percentage point higher than the current rate), following CBO’s projection that 
interest rates will rise back to more normal levels in the next few years.  
 
These assumptions imply an average return of 7.3 percent. While this is somewhat lower than the 
8.0 percent return that is commonly assumed by pension funds, it is worth noting that the inflation 
assumption in this calculation is considerably lower than what most pension funds use in their 
projections. Most pension funds assume an inflation rate of between 2.5 to 3.0 percent, compared to 
the 2.0 percent inflation assumption in this analysis. This means that the slightly lower assumption 
on returns would be offset by the lower assumption on costs due to a lower rate of inflation.   
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TABLE 1 
Projected Stock and Pension Fund Returns, 2011-2041 
 
Market 
Capitalization 
(billions of $) 
Dividend 
Payout 
(billions of $) 
Stock 
Return 
(percent)
Pension Fund
Return 
(percent)
2011 16,156.1 643.7 19.0 14.4
2012 17,060.8 679.7 9.6 8.1
2013 18,016.2 717.8 9.6 8.1
2014 19,025.1 758.0 9.6 8.1
2015 20,090.5 800.4 9.6 8.1
2016 20,994.6 836.4 8.5 7.3
2017 21,939.4 874.1 8.5 7.3
2018 22,926.6 913.4 8.5 7.3
2019 23,958.3 954.5 8.5 7.3
2020 25,036.5 997.4 8.5 7.3
2021 26,088.0 1039.3 8.2 7.1
2022 27,183.7 1083.0 8.2 7.1
2023 28,325.4 1128.5 8.2 7.1
2024 29,515.1 1175.9 8.2 7.1
2025 30,754.7 1225.3 8.2 7.1
2026 32,046.4 1276.7 8.2 7.1
2027 33,392.4 1330.3 8.2 7.1
2028 34,794.8 1386.2 8.2 7.1
2029 36,256.2 1444.4 8.2 7.1
2030 37,779.0 1505.1 8.2 7.1
2031 39,365.7 1568.3 8.2 7.1
2032 41,019.1 1634.2 8.2 7.1
2033 42,741.9 1702.8 8.2 7.1
2034 44,537.0 1774.3 8.2 7.1
2035 46,407.6 1848.9 8.2 7.1
2036 48,356.7 1926.5 8.2 7.1
2037 50,387.7 2007.4 8.2 7.1
2038 52,504.0 2091.7 8.2 7.1
2039 54,709.1 2179.6 8.2 7.1
2040 57,006.9 2271.1 8.2 7.1
2041 59,401.2 2366.5 8.2 7.1
Average 2012-2041  8.4 7.3
Source: Federal Reserve Board and Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
 
 
Pension funds can reasonably assume the returns projected in the table for the portion of their 
assets held in equity. Lower returns would require one or more of the three following assumptions: 
 
1) Economic growth will be substantially lower than the Congressional Budget Office and 
other forecasters predict; 
2) The profit share of output will experience a sustained fall over the next three decade; and/or 
3) There will be a sustained decline in PE ratios. 
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Any of these three assumptions would be an extraordinarily strong assertion about the future course 
of the economy and financial markets. While any or all of these projections for the future are 
possible, there should at least be an argument as to why one or more of these assumptions is likely. 
To date, those advocating that public pensions assume a lower rate of return on equity have not 
given an argument as to why their view of the future of the economy and financial markets differs 
from the consensus. In short, they are asking pension funds to depart from the economic consensus 
without providing either a theoretical argument or evidence to support their differing view of the 
future.   
 
To see that this projected path of returns is more plausible than assuming the risk-free rate, it is 
worth considering the implication for future PE ratios, if stock returns over the next 30 years are 
only equal to the risk-free rate. The calculations assume that the overall economy follows the same 
projected growth path.6 If the returns on stock are just equal to the returns on Treasury bonds, then 
the PE ratio will have to continually decline. This is necessary because the dividend yield is already 
almost as high as the yield on Treasury bills. This means that the price can only rise a very small 
amount, much less than the growth rate of profits, in order to keep the return equal to that on 
government bonds. As the PE falls, the dividend yield rises (firms are still paying the same share of 
their profits as dividends), which means that the PE must fall more rapidly.  
 
Figure 2 shows the PE ratios over the next three decades on the assumption that the yield on 
stocks is the same as the yield on Treasury bonds. As can be seen, this assumption would yield the 
absurd result that stock prices would have to turn negative. In short, unless there is an economic 
collapse, there is not a plausible story where stock returns over any long period will be equal or less 
than the Treasury bond rate.  
 
 
                                                 
6 It is of course possible that the economy will perform markedly worse than most projections assume, in which case 
low returns in the stock market may not be as implausible. However, there have been few sharp turns in growth paths 
in the post-war period (there was a slowdown in growth from the mid-70s to the mid-90s and a speed up since the year 
1995), so it seems reasonable to plan as though a sharp turn is not a likely event. Furthermore if growth fell far enough 
below its projected pace, then even government bonds may not prove to be risk-free, since the federal government 
may find it too costly to meet its debt obligations and consider a partial restructuring.  
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FIGURE 2 
Projected Price-to-Earnings Ratios (Risk-free Rate of Return) 
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Source: Federal Reserve Board, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and author’s calculations. 
 
 
It is also worth noting that if we look back historically at the years in which the PE ratio was below 
15 to 1, then the real return has averaged well over 7.0 percent. Table 1A shows the return on 
stocks for the 30 years subsequent to a year in which the PE ratio was under 15 to 1. The average 
real return for the 18 years between 1949 and 1980 in which the PE ratio was below this level was 
8.2 percent. The lowest return was 4.8 percent.7 
 
It could be the case that governments would simply move away from holding stock as an asset for 
their pension funds if the assumed returns for assessing pension fund adequacy was the same as for 
government bonds. However, if governments went this route, it would mean that, on average, their 
pension funds would actually have worse returns, since the expected return on holding equity will in 
almost all circumstances be higher than the expected return from holding government debt. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The PE ratio is taken from the Economic Report of the President, 2010, Table B-95. The capital gain is taken as the 
rise in the S&P 500, deflated with the GDP deflator. The dividend yield is assumed to be the yield in the first year. The 
capital gain assumption probably understates slightly the gain from a full mix of stocks since it excludes newer fast-
growing companies. The dividend yield assumption may overstate slightly the return, because re-invested dividends 
may get a somewhat lower yield if stock prices have risen. On the other hand, a fund that is regularly rebalanced would 
not invest in stocks if their price rose at a pace that exceeded the rate of growth of the economy.   
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TABLE 1A 
Historic Stock Returns, 30-year Averages (percent) 
 Dividend Yield Real Appreciation Total Return
1949 6.6 2.7 9.3
1950 6.6 2.3 8.9
1951 6.1 1.8 7.9
1952 5.8 1.1 6.9
1953 5.8 2.0 7.8
1954 5.0 1.3 6.3
1955 4.1 0.7 4.8
1956 4.1 1.1 5.2
1957 4.4 1.9 6.3
1970 3.8 5.3 9.1
1973 3.1 3.3 6.4
1974 4.5 5.0 9.5
1975 4.3 5.3 9.6
1976 3.8 5.1 8.8
1977 4.6 5.7 10.4
1978 5.3 5.3 10.6
1979 5.5 4.4 9.9
1980 5.3 5.2 10.5
Average 4.9 3.3 8.2
 
 
There are two main consequences from a decision by public pension funds to forego ownership of 
equity. The first would be higher taxes and/or lower benefits, since the same level of benefits for 
workers would require more financing from the government. Higher returns from investments are a 
direct tradeoff with additional financing from the government. If actual returns drop as a result of 
holding government bonds in place of equities, then governments will have to pay more money to 
support the same level of benefits. Alternatively, governments can cut pension benefits for their 
workers, but even a lower level of benefits could be financed at lower cost to governments if 
pension funds were invested in equities. 
 
The other effect of pulling state and local pensions out of equities should be a somewhat higher rate 
of return on these assets. If a substantial pool of money, like state and local pension funds, were 
withdrawn from equity markets, it would mean that the remaining investors would get higher 
returns. Pension fund investment in stock markets can be seen as a way in which taxpayers share in 
the high yield available to equity investors. If pension funds are effectively excluded from equity 
markets, then it would leave a larger funding burden for the taxpaying public, while providing a 
higher return for those remaining in equity markets. The latter group is primarily wealthy investors. 
In effect, the result of forcing pension funds to divest themselves of equities would be a 
redistribution of income from the taxpaying public as a whole to wealthy investors. 
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The Size of the Public Pension Shortfall in Context  
 
There have been numerous media accounts in recent months warning of large shortfalls in public 
pension funds. Conventional estimates have placed the shortfall at around $1 trillion, while some 
analyses have put the shortfall as high as $3.2 trillion using a discount rate that implies pension funds 
will only earn the risk-free rate of return (Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2009). While there are important 
measurement issues in determining the size of the shortfall, it is also important that the number be 
placed in some context. Most people, including those involved in policy debates, will not have a 
good basis for assessing the meaning of a shortfall measured in the trillions of dollars that must be 
filled over an indefinite period in the future. The relevant context is the size of the projected 
shortfalls relative to the size of the state economies.8  
 
Before going through this exercise, it is worth noting that the size of the shortfall in many of these 
funds has likely already been reduced as a result of the fact that the stock market has continued to 
recover from its downturn in 2008 and 2009. On July 1, 2010, the S&P 500 was already more than 
11 percent higher than its July 1, 2009 level (from 987 on July 1, 2009 to 1101 on July 1, 2010). Most 
funds use the stock market’s closing value at the end of the fiscal year as the basis for determining 
the valuation of their assets. Of course they also use an average, so the valuation would not simply 
reflect the market value at the end of the fiscal year. However, with the market having already risen 
substantially from its low (the S&P 500 had risen another 19 percent to 1293 by January 10, 2011), it 
is likely that pension valuations based on current and future market levels will show smaller 
shortfalls. In other words, a substantial portion of the shortfalls that were reported based on 2009 
valuations have likely already been eliminated by the rise in the market.     
 
Table 2 shows funding levels and liabilities for most of the major state pension funds. The data are 
taken from the National Association of State Pension Fund Administrators (2010, Appendix B). The 
cumulative shortfall in funding as calculated in the table is $647 billion. Column 5 shows this 
shortfall expressed as a share of discounted future state output over the next 30 years, the 
assumption being that this would be roughly the period over which the shortfall needs to be closed. 
The calculations use a 3.0 percent real discount rate and assume that each state grows at the same 
rate as the overall economy.9 
                                                 
8 It is also reasonable to compare the size of the pension fund shortfalls to state budgets over the relevant time frame 
(see Lav and McNichol, 2011 and Munnell et al 2010) 
9 Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009) perform similar calculations and come up with somewhat larger numbers. This analysis is 
based on 2008 estimates of underfunding. It is also possible that this analysis includes a more complete set of state 
pension funds.  
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TABLE 2 
Funding Levels and Liabilities for Major State Pension Funds 
State Plan  
Actuarial 
Funding 
Ratio 
(percent)
Actuarial Value 
of Assets 
(thousand $)
Liabilities 
(thousand $) 
Unfunded 
Accrued Liability 
(thousand $)
Unfunded Liability as 
a percent of Future 
State Income
Latest 
Actuarial 
Valuation Date 
AL Alabama Teachers 74.7 20,582,348 27,537,400 6,955,052 0.14% 9/30/2009
AL Alabama ERS 72.2 9,928,104 13,756,176 3,828,072 0.08% 9/30/2009
AK Alaska PERS 78.8 7,210,772 9,154,282 1,943,510 0.15% 6/30/2008
AK Alaska Teachers 70.2 3,670,086 5,231,654 1,561,568 0.12% 6/30/2008
AR Arkansas Teachers 75.7 10,617,000 14,019,000 3,402,000 0.12% 6/30/2009
AR Arkansas PERS 78.0 5,413,000 6,938,000 1,525,000 0.05% 6/30/2009
AZ Arizona SRS 79.0 27,094,000 34,290,000 7,196,000 0.10% 6/30/2009
AZ Arizona Public Safety PRS 70.0 5,445,497 7,778,394 2,332,897 0.03% 6/30/2009
CA California PERF 86.9 233,272,000 268,324,000 35,052,000 0.06% 6/30/2008
CA California Teachers 78.2 145,142,000 185,683,000 40,541,000 0.07% 6/30/2009
CO Colorado School 69.2 21,054,910 30,412,815 9,357,905 0.13% 12/31/2009
CO Colorado State 67.0 13,382,736 19,977,217 6,594,481 0.09% 12/31/2009
CO Colorado Municipal 76.2 2,932,628 3,850,821 918,193 0.01% 12/31/2009
CO Colorado Affiliated Local 89.2 1,855,493 2,081,304 225,811 0.00% 1/1/2009
CO Colorado Fire & Police 101.0 856,090 847,821 -8,269 0.00% 1/1/2009
CT Connecticut Teachers 70.0 15,271,000 21,801,000 6,530,000 0.10% 6/30/2008
CT Connecticut SERS 51.9 9,990,200 19,243,400 9,253,200 0.14% 6/30/2008
DC DC Police & Fire 100.7 3,048,400 3,027,900 -20,500 0.00% 10/1/2009
DC DC Teachers 92.2 1,445,000 1,567,500 122,500 0.00% 10/1/2009
DE Delaware State Employees 98.8 6,744,050 6,827,006 82,956 0.00% 6/30/2009
FL Florida RS 87.1 118,764,692 136,375,597 17,610,905 0.08% 7/1/2009
GA Georgia Teachers 91.9 54,354,284 59,133,777 4,779,493 0.04% 6/30/2008
GA Georgia ERS 85.7 13,613,606 15,878,022 2,264,416 0.02% 6/30/2009
HI Hawaii ERS 68.8 11,380,961 16,549,069 5,168,108 0.27% 6/30/2008
IA Iowa PERS 81.2 21,123,980 26,018,594 4,894,614 0.12% 6/30/2009
ID Idaho PERS 73.7 8,646,000 11,732,200 3,086,200 0.20% 7/1/2009
IL Illinois Teachers 52.1 38,026,044 73,027,198 35,001,154 0.19% 7/1/2009
IL Illinois Municipal 83.2 22,754,804 27,345,113 4,590,309 0.03% 12/31/2009
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TABLE 2 
Funding Levels and Liabilities for Major State Pension Funds 
State Plan  
Actuarial 
Funding 
Ratio 
(percent)
Actuarial Value 
of Assets 
(thousand $)
Liabilities 
(thousand $) 
Unfunded 
Accrued Liabilit
y
y 
(thousand $)
Unfunded Liabilit  as 
a percent of Future 
State Income
Latest 
Actuarial 
Valuation Date 
IL Illinois Universities 54.3 14,282,000 26,316,200 12,034,200 0.07% 6/30/2009
IL Illinois SERS 43.5 10,999,954 25,298,346 14,298,392 0.08% 6/30/2008
IN Indiana PERF 97.5 9,293,952 9,034,573 -259,379 0.00% 7/1/2008
IN Indiana Teachers 48.2 9,034,048 18,750,063 9,716,015 0.13% 6/30/2008
KS Kansas PERS 58.8 11,827,619 20,106,787 8,279,168 0.23% 12/31/2008
KY Kentucky Teachers 63.6 14,885,981 23,400,426 8,514,445 0.19% 6/30/2009
KY Kentucky County 70.6 7,402,277 10,491,358 3,089,081 0.07% 6/30/2009
KY Kentucky ERS 46.7 5,297,114 11,332,961 6,035,847 0.13% 6/30/2009
LA Louisiana Teachers 59.1 13,500,766 22,839,411 9,338,645 0.16% 6/30/2009
LA Louisiana SERS 60.8 8,499,662 13,986,847 5,487,185 0.09% 6/30/2009
MA Massachusetts Teachers 63.0 21,262,462 33,738,966 12,476,504 0.12% 1/1/2010
MA Massachusetts SERS 76.5 19,019,062 24,862,421 5,843,359 0.06% 1/1/2010
MD Maryland Teachers 66.0 20,600,000 31,200,000 10,600,000 0.13% 6/30/2009
MD Maryland PERS 63.8 11,800,000 18,500,000 6,700,000 0.08% 6/30/2009
ME Maine State and Teacher 74.0 8,631,558 11,668,033 3,036,475 0.21% 6/30/2008
ME Maine Local 112.7 2,201,653 1,953,629 -248,024 -0.02% 6/30/2008
MI Michigan Public Schools 83.6 45,677,000 54,608,000 8,931,000 0.08% 9/30/2008
MI Michigan SERS 82.8 11,403,000 13,766,000 2,363,000 0.02% 9/30/2008
MI Michigan Municipal 75.0 6,245,500 8,321,900 2,076,400 0.02% 12/31/2008
MN Minnesota Teachers 77.4 17,882,408 23,114,802 5,232,394 0.07% 7/1/2009
MN Minnesota PERF 70.0 13,158,490 18,799,416 5,640,926 0.08% 6/30/2009
MN Minnesota State Employees 85.9 9,030,401 10,512,760 1,482,359 0.02% 6/30/2009
MO Missouri Teachers 79.9 28,826,075 36,060,121 7,234,046 0.10% 6/30/2009
MO Missouri State Employees 83.0 7,876,079 9,494,807 1,618,728 0.02% 6/30/2009
MO Missouri Local 80.0 3,330,663 4,161,775 831,112 0.01% 2/28/2009
MO Missouri PEERS 80.7 2,792,182 3,458,044 665,862 0.01% 6/30/2009
MO Missouri DOT and Highway 47.3 1,471,497 3,113,394 1,641,897 0.02% 6/30/2009
MS Mississippi PERS 67.3 20,597,581 30,594,546 9,996,965 0.36% 6/30/2009
MT Montana PERS 83.5 4,002,212 4,792,819 790,607 0.08% 6/30/2009
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TABLE 2 
Funding Levels and Liabilities for Major State Pension Funds 
State Plan  
Actuarial 
Funding 
Ratio 
(percent)
Actuarial Value 
of Assets 
(thousand $)
Liabilities 
(thousand $) 
Unfunded 
Accrued Liabilit
y
y 
(thousand $)
Unfunded Liabilit  as 
a percent of Future 
State Income
Latest 
Actuarial 
Valuation Date 
MT Montana Teachers 63.8 2,762,200 4,331,000 1,568,800 0.15% 7/1/2009
NC North Carolina Teachers and 99.3 55,127,658 55,518,745 391,087 0.00% 12/31/2008
NC North Carolina Local 99.6 17,100,739 17,173,975 73,236 0.00% 12/31/2008
ND North Dakota Teachers 77.7 1,900,300 2,445,900 545,600 0.06% 7/1/2009
ND North Dakota PERS 85.1 1,617,100 1,901,200 284,100 0.03% 6/30/2009
NE Nebraska Schools 86.6 7,007,582 8,092,339 1,084,757 0.04% 7/1/2009
NH New Hampshire Retirement 58.3 4,937,320 8,475,052 3,537,732 0.21% 6/30/2009
NJ New Jersey Teachers 65.0 34,708,001 53,418,429 18,710,428 0.13% 6/30/2009
NJ New Jersey PERS 64.9 28,879,176 44,470,403 15,591,227 0.11% 6/30/2009
NJ New Jersey Police & Fire 70.7 22,937,838 32,442,101 9,504,263 0.07% 6/30/2009
NM New Mexico PERF 84.2 12,575,142 14,932,624 2,357,482 0.11% 6/30/2009
NM New Mexico Teachers 67.5 9,366,300 13,883,300 4,517,000 0.21% 6/30/2009
NV Nevada Regular Employees 73.4 19,158,282 26,087,621 6,929,339 0.19% 6/30/2009
NV Nevada Police Officer and 68.9 4,813,594 6,987,537 2,173,943 0.06% 6/30/2008
NY NY State & Local ERS 107.3 128,916,000 120,183,000 -8,733,000 -0.03% 4/1/2008
NY New York State Teachers 106.6 88,254,700 82,777,500 -5,477,200 -0.02% 6/30/2008
NY NY State & Local Police & 108.0 22,767,000 21,072,000 -1,695,000 -0.01% 4/1/2008
OH Ohio PERS 75.3 55,315,148 73,466,166 18,151,018 0.13% 12/31/2008
OH Ohio Teachers 60.0 54,902,859 91,440,955 36,538,096 0.27% 6/30/2009
OH Ohio School Employees 82.0 9,723,000 14,221,000 4,498,000 0.03% 6/30/2009
OH Ohio Police & Fire 65.1 9,309,000 14,307,000 4,998,000 0.04% 1/1/2008
OK Oklahoma Teachers 49.8 9,439,000 18,950,900 9,511,900 0.22% 6/30/2009
OK Oklahoma PERS 66.8 6,208,245 9,291,458 3,083,213 0.07% 7/1/2009
OR Oregon PERS 80.2 43,520,600 54,259,500 10,738,900 0.23% 12/31/2008
PA Pennsylvania School 86.0 60,922,100 70,845,600 9,923,500 0.06% 6/30/2008
PA Pennsylvania State ERS 84.4 30,205,000 35,797,000 5,592,000 0.04% 12/31/2009
RI Rhode Island ERS 56.2 6,231,411 11,083,014 4,851,603 0.35% 6/30/2007
RI Rhode Island Municipal 90.3 1,064,615 1,179,233 114,618 0.01% 6/30/2007
SC South Carolina RS 69.3 24,699,678 35,663,419 10,963,741 0.24% 7/1/2008
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TABLE 2 
Funding Levels and Liabilities for Major State Pension Funds 
State Plan  
Actuarial 
Funding 
Ratio 
(percent)
Actuarial Value 
of Assets 
(thousand $)
Liabilities 
(thousand $) 
Unfunded 
Accrued Liabilit
y
y 
(thousand $)
Unfunded Liabilit  as 
a percent of Future 
State Income
Latest 
Actuarial 
Valuation Date 
SC South Carolina Police 77.9 3,363,136 4,318,955 955,819 0.02% 7/1/2008
SD South Dakota PERS 91.8 6,778,500 7,387,400 608,900 0.06% 6/30/2008
TN TN State and Teachers 96.2 26,214,995 27,240,151 1,025,156 0.01% 7/1/2007
TN TN Political Subdivisions 89.5 4,897,974 5,475,620 577,646 0.01% 7/1/2007
TX Texas Teachers 83.1 106,384,000 128,030,000 21,646,000 0.07% 8/31/2009
TX Texas ERS 87.4 23,509,622 26,907,779 3,398,157 0.01% 8/31/2009
TX Texas County & District 89.8 16,564,213 18,448,162 1,883,949 0.01% 12/31/2009
TX Texas Municipal 75.8 16,305,700 21,525,100 5,219,400 0.02% 12/31/2009
TX Texas LECOS 86.1 780,808 907,102 126,294 0.00% 8/31/2009
UT Utah Noncontributory 85.6 16,622,548 19,429,734 2,807,186 0.09% 12/31/2009
VA Virginia Retirement System 84.0 52,548,000 62,554,000 10,006,000 0.09% 6/30/2008
VT Vermont Teachers 65.4 1,374,079 2,101,838 727,759 0.10% 6/30/2009
VT Vermont State Employees 78.9 1,217,638 1,544,144 326,506 0.04% 6/30/2009
WA Washington PERS 2/3 101.1 16,692,700 16,508,000 -184,700 0.00% 6/30/2008
WA Washington PERS 1 70.9 9,852,900 13,901,000 4,048,100 0.04% 6/30/2008
WA Washington Teachers Plan 1 76.8 8,262,300 10,753,900 2,491,600 0.03% 6/30/2008
WA Washington Teachers Plan 2/3 107.9 5,681,000 5,263,800 -417,200 0.00% 6/30/2008
WA Washington LEOFF Plan 1 128.0 5,592,500 4,367,700 -1,224,800 -0.01% 6/30/2008
WA Washington LEOFF Plan 2 126.4 5,052,700 3,998,200 -1,054,500 -0.01% 6/30/2008
WA Washington School Employees 104.3 2,302,600 2,207,300 -95,300 0.00% 6/30/2008
WI Wisconsin Retirement System 99.8 78,911,300 79,104,600 193,300 0.00% 12/31/2009
WV West Virginia PERS 79.7 3,930,701 4,930,158 999,457 0.05% 7/1/2009
WV West Virginia Teachers 41.3 3,554,771 8,607,869 5,053,098 0.28% 6/30/2009
WY Wyoming Public Employees 87.5 5,742,542 6,565,677 823,135 0.08% 1/1/2010
 Total 79.8 $2,561,175,228 $3,208,469,565 $647,294,337   
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In most states the unfunded liabilities are well under 0.2 percent of future income. This implies that 
increased revenue equal to 20 cents of every $100 of future output would be more than sufficient to 
eliminate the shortfall. Even in the states with largest shortfalls, the burden appears manageable. In 
Ohio, the shortfall is equal to 0.47 percent of future output, in Illinois it is 0.37 percent of future 
output, and in Mississippi and Rhode Island it is equal to 0.36 percent. Of course, this estimate of 
the size of the shortfall will be overstated or understated if a state has growth that exceeds or falls 
behind the national average. Some of the states with larger shortfalls, like Ohio and Mississippi, may 
lag the overall growth of the economy, which means that the burden of the unfunded pension 
liability would be greater than the calculations in Table 2 imply. Of course, since the valuation date 
for the pension funds was before the recent run-up in the stock market, some portion of this 
shortfall will be eliminated simply by the recovery of the stock market when the valuation is 
updated.    
  
 
Conclusion   
 
The shortfalls facing most state and local pension funds have been seriously misrepresented in 
public debates. The major cause of these shortfalls has not been inadequate contributions by state 
governments, but rather the plunge in the stock market following the collapse of the housing 
bubble. Given the low PE ratios in the stock market, pension fund assumptions on the future rate of 
return on their assets are consistent with most projections of economic growth and past experience. 
Furthermore, when expressed relative to the size of their economies, most states are facing shortfalls 
that appear easily manageable. 
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